Legitimising the Use of Force in International Politics by Corneliu Bjola

Author:Corneliu Bjola [Bjola, Corneliu]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Europe, Eastern, Military, General, Iraq War (2003-2011), Law, International, Political Science, International Relations, Security (National & International), Peace
ISBN: 9781135256852
Google: nESPAgAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2009-09-10T16:07:01+00:00

Deliberative context

Besides the accuracy of justifications, a second important component of deliberative legitimacy deals with the question of whether actors enjoy equal opportunities to participate in deliberations leading to decisions to use force. Interestingly, despite the intensity of the differences between the main actors, the deliberative context preceding the intervention in Kosovo was fairly balanced. The supporters of the military intervention, most notably the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, relentlessly pressed for the Security Council to authorize NATO to take military action against the FRY under Chapter VII. To this end, they introduced three draft resolutions to the Security Council prior to the NATO campaign, and the Council adopted all of them with a clear majority of votes. Most importantly, the unity of positions among the majority of the members of the Security Council was not the result of political coercion exerted, for example, by the US hegemon on smaller states. The Europeans agreed with the United States that the situation in Kosovo could lead to a humanitarian disaster and because of that they backed the idea of possible military intervention.107 Compared to the Americans, however, they preferred to take a more gradual approach to a possible use of force (Bjola 2005a). Their position eventually prevailed and led, inter alia, to the convening of the Rambouillet peace conference.108 This demonstrated that the Europeans were exerting genuine influence over the decision-making and were not simply deferring to the most powerful actor among them.

The same dynamic also unfolded at the NATO level. The absence of an explicit UN resolution authorizing the use of force against the FRY raised serious concerns for many NATO governments, especially those of Germany, Belgium, and France. Other countries were doubtful about the advantages of using force for political reasons, either because of their cultural ties to Serbia (e.g. Greece) or because they were mindful of a possible increased influx of Albanian refugees (e.g. Italy) (Bellamy 2002:86). The United States did exert pressure on its European allies to back a NATO intervention even without an explicit UN authorization, but its efforts included only exchanges of arguments, not threats or intimidatory tactics (Albright and Woodward 2003:389). The worsening of the humanitarian situation in Kosovo as a result of the Serbian counteroffensive during the summer of 1998 eventually swayed the Europeans to overcome their reluctance and fully support the use of force against the FRY (Judah 2000:182–183). In hindsight, it appears that Europeans’ objections to the use of force might have had a slight chance to be more appropriately addressed had they and the United States worked more closely with the Russians.109

The opponents of the intervention, especially Russia and China, also enjoyed unobstructed opportunities to express their reservations about the need for a military intervention in what they viewed as the “internal affairs” of FRY.110 With the notable exception of its reaction to the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade by NATO,111 China preferred to maintain a low profile during the crisis and to let Russia lead the fight against the United Nations’ authorizing the use of force against the FRY.

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